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In October 2001, four cases of inhalational anthrax occurred in workers in a Washington, D.C., mail facility
that processed envelopes containing Bacillus anthracis spores. We reviewed the envelopes’ paths and
obtained exposure histories and nasal swab cultures from postal workers. Environmental sampling was
performed. A sample of employees was assessed for antibody concentrations to B. anthracis protective
antigen. Case-patients worked on nonoverlapping shifts throughout the facility, suggesting multiple aero-
solization events. Environmental sampling showed diffuse contamination of the facility. Potential workplace
exposures were similar for the case-patients and the sample of workers. All nasal swab cultures and
serum antibody tests were negative. Available tools could not identify subgroups of employees at higher
risk for exposure or disease. Prophylaxis was necessary for all employees. To protect postal workers
against bioterrorism, measures to reduce the risk of occupational exposure are necessary. 
n October 2001, four cases of inhalational anthrax occurred
in employees at the Washington, D.C., Postal Processing
and Distribution Center (DCPDC) (1,2). These cases were part
of a multistate outbreak of inhalational and cutaneous anthrax
associated with intentional distribution of envelopes contain-
ing Bacillus anthracis spores to media and federal government
offices (2–4). Together, these represent the first reported cases
of inhalational anthrax in postal workers and the first reported
outbreak of inhalational anthrax caused by occupational expo-
sure in the United States since 1957 (5,6). 
The investigation and public health response to this out-
break of inhalational anthrax are reported here. The urgent
public health response was directed at preventing new cases of
inhalational anthrax through the use of prophylactic antimicro-
bial drugs for persons potentially exposed to B. anthracis
spores. The public health response also provided useful infor-
mation about occupational exposure to aerosolized spores in
this type of workplace and the performance of potential tools
for determining exposure, such as work history, nasal swabs,
immune response markers, and environmental sampling. 
Methods
Setting and Background
On October 15, 2001, in an office of the Washington, D.C.,
U. S. Capitol complex, an envelope addressed to Senator Tom
Daschle, intentionally contaminated with B. anthracis spores,
was opened. This event occurred 2 weeks after a report from
Florida of the first-ever inhalational anthrax cases related to
envelopes containing B. anthracis spores; those cases occurred
in employees of a media company (3). The Washington, D.C.,
Department of Health (DCDOH), Office of the Attending Phy-
sician, U.S. Capitol, and the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) immediately initiated a multiagency public
health response and epidemiologic investigation (7). Enhanced
surveillance activities for inhalational anthrax in the national
Capitol area were established through a cooperative effort of
the DCDOH, Virginia Department of Health, Maryland
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, and CDC. 
The epidemiologic investigation determined that the B.
anthracis–contaminated envelope addressed to Sen. Daschle
was processed on October 12 at the DCPDC before entering
the Capitol mail distribution system. Late on October 19, a
DCPDC employee was admitted to a Virginia hospital with a
diagnosis of suspected inhalational anthrax. The CDC team
visited the DCPDC on October 20. The suspected case-patient
worked in an area of the DCPDC where the envelope had not
been processed; he also worked in a second mail facility in
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Maryland. The diagnosis of inhalational anthrax was con-
firmed on October 21 (1,2). The DCPDC and the second mail
facility in Maryland were closed on October 21. On October
20–22, three additional cases of suspected inhalational anthrax
were identified in the DCPDC employees; two of these
patients died (Table 1). B. anthracis grew from blood cultures
from all patients within 24 hours. B. anthracis was confirmed
by B. anthracis–specific polymerase chain reaction assay at
CDC (2). 
A second envelope with B. anthracis spores, addressed to
Sen. Patrick Leahy, was identified on November 16. This
envelope was recovered from a sealed drum containing U.S.
Capitol mail quarantined on October 17, 2001.
Postexposure Prophylaxis
After confirmation of the first case of inhalational anthrax
in a DCPDC employee, antimicrobial postexposure prophy-
laxis (PEP) was recommended to all DCPDC employees and
visitors to the nonpublic mail-processing area (3,8). DCPDC
employees who had been absent from work >24 hours in the
past 7 days were contacted to identify any additional cases and
inform workers of the recommendation for PEP. Beginning
October 21, workers were given a 10-day supply of antimicro-
bial therapy, pending further investigation. DCPDC employees
returned to the public health department antimicrobial agent
distribution centers to receive an additional 50-day supply of
antimicrobial therapy. All DCPDC employees were offered
free medication from the U.S. National Pharmaceutical Stock-
pile at D.C. General Hospital through a cooperative effort of
the DCDOH and the U.S. Public Health Service. Employees
could choose to obtain appropriate medication from other
sources. The United States Postal Service (USPS) notified
employees from the DCPDC about the recommendation for
postexposure prophylaxis and urged them to comply. Informa-
tion on the symptoms of inhalational anthrax, the biology of B.
anthracis, and possible adverse effects from antimicrobial
agents was distributed to postal workers. The number of
employees who obtained antimicrobial therapy from D.C.
General Hospital, the Virginia Department of Health, and
Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene was
recorded. 
Postal System Assessment
In collaboration with the USPS and the Postal Inspection
Service, we assessed routine mail-handling procedures and
reviewed the path of the two envelopes that were known to
contain B. anthracis spores. From unique envelope markings,
postal inspectors determined the time of automated envelope
processing and the machinery used during processing. To
establish the number of employees potentially exposed during
the passage and processing of the two envelopes, DCPDC
employee work zone locations, job descriptions, and assigned
work shifts were obtained from USPS administrative data. 
Case Exposure Histories
We interviewed surviving case-patients and close associ-
ates of those who died by using a standard exposure question-
naire. Case-patients were assessed for job description, work
and break locations, travel and medical history, and potential
exposure to natural reservoirs of B. anthracis spores. Timecard
logs established exact times of work during October 11–21.
Environmental Assessment
Beginning October 23, the DCPDC facility was sampled
extensively with a combination of surface wipes, surface vac-
uum samples, and air vacuum samples, reported in detail else-
where (9–11). 
Nasal Swab Cultures
Nasal swab cultures from the DCPDC employees and
those who reported visiting that facility during the period
October 10–21 were obtained on October 21–22 during the
distribution of antimicrobial therapy. Specimens were pro-
cessed by standard microbiologic methods at the Maryland
Department of Health laboratory (12).
Serologic and Exposure Survey
We conducted a survey to evaluate occupational exposures
of workers and determine whether there was evidence of
immunologic response to B. anthracis protective antigen.
Exposure histories and serum samples were obtained from a
convenience sample of DCPDC employees who went to D.C
General Hospital on October 29–30 for their additional 50-day
supply of antimicrobial therapy. Each participant was asked to
allow a serum sample to be collected and to be individually
interviewed with the standardized exposure questionnaire used
for case-patients. Informed consent was obtained from all par-
ticipants.
One blood sample was obtained from each participant. The
serum was separated and stored at 4°C. Anti-protective antigen
immunoglobulin G (anti-PA IgG) antibody concentrations in
Table 1. Characteristics of inhalational anthrax cases among employ-
ees of the Washington, D.C., Processing and Distribution Centera
Case 1  Case 2  Case 3 Case 4 
Age (yrs) 56 56 55 47
Race AA AA AA AA
Date symptoms began 10/16 10/16 10/16 10/16
Date of suspected IA 
diagnosis
10/19 10/20 10/21 10/22
Date IA confirmed 10/21 10/22 10/23 10/26
Underlying medical 
conditions 
No No Yesb Yesc
Death due to IA (date) No No Yes (10/21) Yes (10/22)
aAA = African-American, IA=inhalational anthrax.
bDiabetes mellitus, sarcoidosis.
cAsthma. BIOTERRORISM-RELATED ANTHRAX
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serum specimens were determined by a quantitative enzyme-
linked immunoassay described in detail elsewhere (13). 
Comparison of Case-Patients and Survey Participants
We compared exposure histories and underlying diseases
of the case-patients with the sample of surveyed workers to
clarify factors that may have contributed to the four cases of
inhalational anthrax at DCPDC. Data from the standardized
exposure questionnaire from the DCPDC cases and the other
sampled employees were compared by a case-control analysis
with two-tailed Fisher exact tests for dichotomous variables or
the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for continuous variables; p val-
ues of <0.05 were considered significant.
Results
Postexposure Prophylaxis
Of 2,403 employees at the DCPDC, 1,870 (78%) were
recorded as receiving a 50-day supply of antimicrobial therapy
at DCDOH, Virginia Department of Health, or Maryland
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene postexposure pro-
phylaxis distribution centers. Five members of the CDC team
received PEP. 
Postal System Assessment
The DCPDC is a 500,000-square foot facility (Figure 1).
Approximately 59 million pieces of incoming mail were pro-
cessed at the DCPDC during October 11–21. The two contam-
inated envelopes entered the DCPDC on the evening of
October 11 or early morning of October 12 in a tray of enve-
lopes originating at the processing and distribution center in
Trenton, New Jersey. This tray was taken from the dock (Fig-
ure 1, point A) to a large tray-sorting machine (Figure 1, point
B) and then moved to a high-speed envelope-sorting machine
known as a delivery bar-code sorter (DBCS). The DBCS
moves up to 30,000 letters per hour into a series of bins for
subsequent distribution. At the end of each work shift, the
DBCS is cleaned by a procedure that blows compressed air (70
lbs per square in) into the machine. Unique processing mark-
ings on the two envelopes showed that DBCS number 17 (Fig-
ure 1, point C) sorted both envelopes on October 12 between
7:05 and 7:30 a.m. The two letters appeared to be processed
within minutes of each other. 
The envelope addressed to Sen. Daschle was sorted into a
bin destined for the U.S. Capitol, taken out of the DBCS num-
ber 17, and moved to the government mail section (Figure 1,
point D). The government mail section handles distribution of
all letters to U.S. government addresses in the metropolitan
D.C. area. Routinely, in a process known as riffling, envelopes
are flipped through individually for manual confirmation of
appropriate sorting. The envelope addressed to Sen. Daschle
transited the government mail section on October 12 between
7:30 a.m. and noon, at which time it was dispatched from the
loading dock (Figure 1, point E) to the U.S. Capitol’s mail dis-
tribution facility. 
The envelope addressed to Sen. Leahy was incorrectly
sorted as destined for the U.S. State Department, State Annex
32, which has an independent small mail-processing facility in
Virginia. The exact path of this envelope is unclear from Octo-
ber 12 to 17. On October 17, the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion quarantined all remaining U.S. Capitol mail and placed it
into sealed drums for further investigation; the Leahy envelope
was found in one of these drums on November 16. The letter
appeared to be leaking.  Routine procedures for redirecting
incorrectly sorted envelopes destined for a U.S. government
address usually involve employees in the DCPDC government
mail section. If routine procedures had been followed, and the
envelope were recognized as incorrectly sorted, the envelope
would have been manually redirected in the DCPDC govern-
ment mail section in the period October 12–16. 
A fifth case of suspected inhalational anthrax in a postal
worker in Virginia was reported on October 25, 2001. The
case-patient worked in State Annex 32 (3). Whether the enve-
lope to Sen. Leahy remained in the DCPDC or transited
Figure 1. Floor map of the Washington, D.C., Postal Processing and
Distribution Center with the known locations of the two Bacillus anthra-
cis–contaminated envelopes (gray diamonds with letters) and work
locations of case-patients (black circles with numbers) in the facility on
October 12, 2001. The estimated location of case-patients during the
time of processing the contaminated envelopes at point C, when the let-
ters were processed by the high-speed sorter machine, are shown as
open circles. The main processing area of the facility, containing all of
the high-speed sorter machines, and the government mail section of
the facility are marked.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 10, October 2002 1069
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through the State Annex 32 is not known. Mail destined for the
State Annex 32 was sorted at the same time in DBCS number
17 as the envelope addressed to Sen. Leahy. Environmental
sampling results from State Annex 32 showed widespread
contamination with B. anthracis spores, similar to the
DCPDC.
Of the 1,961 employees of the DCPDC nonpublic mail-
room area, 610 (31%) were assigned to work in one of the
same work zones as the four case-patients from this facility.
During the time of the two envelopes’ passage and processing
through the DCPDC, approximately 108 (6%) worked in the
main processing area with the DBCS machines between 12
a.m.–12 p.m. on October 12, and 87 (4%) employees worked
in the government mail section (Figure 1). Two of the four
case-patients worked in one of these work zones. The attack
rate for inhalational anthrax in these combined areas was 1%
(2/195).
Exposure Histories
The clinical characteristics of the case-patients have been
described.(2) All four case-patients from the DCPDC were
African-American; case-patient 5 from the mail-processing
facility for the State Department was white (Table 1). Only
two case-patients had underlying medical conditions. Case-
patient 3 had adult-onset diabetes mellitus and a 30-year his-
tory of sarcoidosis, although the patient was not on medication
for either condition (14). Case-patient 4 had a diagnosis of
asthma and was periodically treated with bronchodilators. 
Two of the four case-patients from DCPDC worked within
several meters of the path of the processed envelopes (Figures
1 and 2). Only one case-patient routinely worked directly with
high-speed envelope-sorting machinery, including routine
overtime on DBCS number 17. At the time the two contami-
nated envelopes were sorted in the DCPDC by DBCS number
17, only case-patients 2 and 4 were physically in the DCPDC
facility (Figure 2). However, case-patient 1 returned during the
window of time when DBCS number 17 was cleaned by blow-
ing compressed air into the machine, between 8:00 a.m. and
9:40 a.m. Case-patient 3 returned to work in the government
mail section (Figure 1, point D) at 8:00 p.m. on October 12.
Environmental Sampling
Diffuse environmental contamination with B. anthracis
was found throughout the nonpublic mail-processing area of
the DCPDC, particularly on DBCS number 17 and in the gov-
ernment mail section of the facility (9–11). In addition, two
supply air ventilation diffusers, located above the area where
two of the case-patients worked, were contaminated with B.
anthracis spores (10,11). None of the samples taken from the
public area of the facility were positive for B. anthracis spores. 
Nasal Swab Cultures
Nasal swab cultures from 3,110 DCPDC employees and vis-
itors, collected 9–10 days after the two envelopes were pro-
cessed at the DCPDC, were negative for growth of B. anthracis. 
Seroprevalence and Exposure Survey
On October 29–30, a total of 1,657 employees and visitors
to the DCPDC went to D.C. General Hospital to receive addi-
tional antibiotic supplies. Of these, 784 (47%) were asked to
participate in the survey; 224 (29%) of 784 DCPDC employ-
ees participated. Serum samples were obtained from 202
(94%). None of the 202 serum samples had significant detect-
able specific IgG antibody concentrations of anti-PA IgG,
including the three participants who reported a remote history
of anthrax vaccination.
The routine work activities of case-patients were also rela-
tively common for the surveyed DCPDC workers (Table 2).
Fifty-four percent reported that they manually sorted mail, and
39% reported that they riffled mail. Seven percent of survey
participants reported that they riffled mail on October 12. Few
employees reported the use of masks (7%), although 47% of
survey participants and 50% of case-patients reported using
gloves.
Comparison of Case-Patients and Survey Participants
Differences in underlying medical conditions or workplace
exposures between the DCPDC case-patients and the survey
participants were not statistically significant (Table 2). With
sarcoidosis included as a chronic lung disease, more case-
patients had chronic lung disease than did survey participants
(50% vs. 9%; odds ratio 9.65; 95% confidence interval 1.29 to
72.2; p=0.01). None of the case-patients currently smoked cig-
arettes, compared with 24% of the participants. Specific mail-
handling activities such as manually sorting mail or working
on a sorting machine also did not differ. No case-patients and
few (10%) of the serosurvey participants handled bulk mail.
Discussion
At least two letters containing B. anthracis spores were
processed at the DCPDC facility on October 12, 2001, result-
ing in an outbreak of four cases of inhalational anthrax in
Figure 2. Comparing the time period that the case-patients were at the
Washington, D.C., Postal Processing and Distribution Center (solid
black bars) to the time period that the two envelopes containing Bacillus
anthracis spores were processed at the facility (gray bars = known loca-
tion, gray hatched bars = unknown location) on October 12, 2001. The
time that the high-speed sorting machine (delivery bar-code sort num-
ber 17) was cleaned, by blowing compressed air into the machine, is
denoted by the gray striped area.BIOTERRORISM-RELATED ANTHRAX
1070 Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 10, October 2002
postal employees who worked in that facility. Our investiga-
tion demonstrated widespread contamination of the facility
with B. anthracis spores, including areas through which the
two letters were unlikely to have traveled. The case-patients
did not all work directly along the path of the contaminated
envelopes as they were processed through the facility on Octo-
ber 12, and two patients were not even in the building at the
time of mechanical sorting. Therefore, inhalational anthrax
likely resulted from multiple aerosolization events, including
processing of the letters through the high-speed sorting
machine, manual sorting and riffling of mail, and cleaning the
high-speed sorting machine by blowing compressed air into it.
Evaluation of re-aerosolization of B. anthracis spores at the
DCPDC, conducted after partial cleaning of the high-speed
sorter that processed the B. anthracis–containing envelopes,
DBCS number 17, identified ongoing low-level aerosolization
after the machine was turned on, suggesting aerosolized spores
were likely present at some level throughout the 10 days from
October 12 until the facility closed on October 21 (15). 
Before recognition of inhalational anthrax among postal
workers in Washington, D.C., and New Jersey, two cases of
inhalational anthrax and several cases of cutaneous anthrax
were identified in Florida and New York in employees of
media companies; the latter cases were associated with con-
taminated envelopes postmarked at the Trenton Processing and
Distribution Center (PDC) September 18, 2001 (2,7). Despite
this, the first recognition of inhalational disease in the postal
service occurred in Washington, D.C., associated with letters
processed in the Trenton PDC, October 9, 2001. Why the
envelopes processed in October resulted in cases of inhala-
tional anthrax among postal workers while those processed in
September did not is unclear. A likely possibility is that the
characteristics of the B. anthracis preparation or the condition
of the envelope(s) at the time of transits through the DCPDC
in October (or both) differed from that in September (16). The
events that occurred in October in Washington, D.C., suggest
the need to ensure that future bioterrorism events involving B.
anthracis contamination of envelopes incorporate new under-
standing of the aerosolization potential in the PDC environ-
ment, the need for extensive traceback of contaminated
envelopes, and broad initiation of prophylaxis to all persons
potentially exposed to spores. 
Given the widespread contamination of the DCPDC and
the likelihood of multiple aerosolization events, why the four
case-patients developed inhalational anthrax but other workers
in the same facility did not is not clear. Some underlying med-
ical conditions may make persons more susceptible to inhala-
tional anthrax during the initial period after exposure, although
we were unable to demonstrate this conclusively in this inves-
tigation, primarily because of small numbers. Many employ-
ees in the DCPDC performed activities at work that might
have resulted in aerosolization of spores. Given the potential
for a long incubation period, especially after low-dose expo-
sures (17,18), and documented re-aerosolization (15), many
additional cases of inhalational anthrax were likely prevented
by the postexposure prophylaxis given to all facility employ-
ees 9 days after the two envelopes were processed at the
DCPDC. 
More than 2,000 postal employees were advised to take 60
days of antimicrobial agents to prevent inhalational anthrax.
Table 2. Comparison of characteristics and potential exposures among case-patients and survey participants from the Washington, D.C., Pro-
cessing and Distribution Center
Characteristics and potential exposures Cases (n=4) N (%) Participants (n=214) N (%) OR (95% CI)a p value
Characteristics
Median years of age (range) 56 (47–56) 49 (25–71) 0.31
Underlying medical conditions
Any underlying condition 2 (50) 51 (24) 3.2 (0.44 to 23.3) 0.23
Chronic lung diseaseb 1 (25) 20 (9) 3.6 (0.38 to 38.8) 0.25
Diabetes mellitus 1 (25) 18 (8) 3.6 (0.38 to 38.8) 0.25
Heart disease 0 15 (7) 0.58
Liver disease 0 4 (2) 0.78
Recent corticosteroid usec 09  ( 4 ) 0 . 7 8
Potential exposures
Manually sorted mail  3 (75) 115 (54) 2.6 (0.23 to 64.8) 0.63
Riffled mail 3 (75) 84 (39) 4.6 (0.4 to 116.9) 0.30
Worked on sorter machine 1 (25) 75 (35) 0.61 (0.02 to 6.8) 1.00
 Bacillus anthracis vaccination 0 3 (1) 1.00
Worked on 10/12/2001 4 (100) 178 (83) 0.48
aOR, odds ratio. CI, confidence interval.
bChronic lung disease includes asthma, bronchitis, emphysema, and obstructive lung disease.
cUse within previous 2 weeks.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 10, October 2002 1071
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We used currently available methods, including nasal swab
cultures, a serologic assay, and environmental sampling, to
identify DCPDC workers who were exposed to B. anthracis
spores. While the environmental sampling and exposure sur-
vey suggested that many persons could have been exposed to
B. anthracis, neither the nasal swab cultures nor serologic sur-
vey could reliably identify subgroups of DCPDC workers who
were exposed and thus at higher risk of developing inhala-
tional anthrax. Therefore, among DCPDC employees, postex-
posure prophylaxis was necessary for all workers in the
facility. Until better methods to determine exposure to B.
anthracis and to assess risk factors for development of inhala-
tional anthrax are available, broad implementation of postex-
posure prophylaxis to all persons potentially exposed will be
necessary. Vaccines may play a role in postexposure prophy-
laxis, in addition to their recognized role in preexposure pro-
phylaxis for persons from selected high-risk occupations.
 Serologic analyses for B. anthracis have been developed
to confirm seroconversion after anthrax vaccine administration
(19) but have been used to provide retrospective confirmation
of cutaneous B. anthracis infection (20,21). During this bioter-
rorism event, the anti-PA IgG antibody assay was developed,
validated, and used to confirm clinical cases of disease for the
first time; the assay had good sensitivity and specificity to
detect clinical disease (13). As demonstrated here, this IgG
assay was not able to determine whether persons without clini-
cal disease were exposed or infected with B. anthracis;
whether an anti-PA IgM antibody assay would improve sensi-
tivity is unknown. Although we did not obtain serum speci-
mens from DCPDC employees at a longer interval after
exposure, an investigation of employees on Capitol Hill failed
to detect anti-PA IgG antibody as late as 6 weeks after expo-
sure (7). Additionally, all DCPDC participants in the survey
had been taking antimicrobial agents since October 21–22; the
antimicrobial agents may have blunted the immune response.
Nasal swab cultures collected 9 days after the two envelopes
were processed at the DCPDC were also negative. These find-
ings may be due to many factors, including low exposure to
spores, the transient nature of B. anthracis spores in the nasal
passages, or the low sensitivity of this assay. Previous studies
have isolated B. anthracis in nasal passages long periods after
exposure (4,6); however, the characteristics of the spores dis-
seminated throughout the DCPDC may not be similar to those
previously studied. Environmental sampling detected B.
anthracis spores in the DCPDC but at this time cannot deter-
mine the inoculum size. In addition, the correlation between
environmental culture data and risk for disease remains
unclear. In light of these limitations, multiple criteria, includ-
ing epidemiologic and environmental results, should be con-
sidered when deciding whether prolonged postexposure
prophylaxis is warranted. 
Because of the unprecedented nature of this outbreak, the
risks of inhalational anthrax associated with exposure to B.
anthracis spores were unknown when we began our investiga-
tion. We have learned that the preparations of B. anthracis
spores used in this event had a high potential for diffuse aero-
solization, especially in settings such as the DCPDC. Our cur-
rent diagnostic tools are limited in their ability to identify
persons who were exposed to spores and likely to become ill;
future studies are needed to improve these tools. In spite of
this, many procedures that increased the likelihood of spore
dissemination in PDC facilities have been identified and can
be modified to reduce the risk to workers in the future. For
example, the practice of blowing compressed air into sorting
machines has been discontinued, and use of appropriate respi-
ratory protective equipment could be encouraged (22). Occu-
pational safety of postal workers from bioterrorism and other
health hazards can be enhanced with attention to engineering,
procedural safety measures, and personal protective equip-
ment. The public health response to future bioterrorism events
that involve B. anthracis spores should include extensive tra-
ceback of contaminated envelopes and broad use of prophylac-
tic measures to prevent disease. 
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